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IN AND FOR THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH - PROVO DEPARTMENT
INA MARIE JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
NELDON PAUL JOHNSON,
Respondent.
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO VACATE DECREE OF
DIVORCE AND AMENDED DECREE OF
DIVORCE AND MOTION TO DISMISS
FOR WANT OF SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION PURSUANT TO Utah
RCiv.P. 12(b)(1), 12(h) and 60(b)(4)
District Court Case No.:004401468
Judge: Steven Hansen
Neldon Paul Johnson, Respondent in the above captioned matter, respectfully submits his
reply memorandum ofpoints and authorities in support ofhis Motion to Vacate Decree ofDivorce
and Amended Decree ofDivorce and Motion to Dismiss for Want ofSubject Matter Jurisdiction.
A. RESPONDENT'S PRIOR STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner has not controverted any ofthe facts contained in the Statement ofFacts presented
by Respondent in support ofhis Motion to Vacate and Dismiss. Therefore, each ofthe facts stated
in paragraphs 1 through 11 of Respondent's Statement of Fact must be deemed to be true for
purposes of this motion.
B. RESPONSE RE: PETITIONER'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Initially it should be noted that each of the paragraphs ofPetitioner's "Statement ofFacts",
are comprised of rambling statements of fact mingled with argument, most of the facts having no
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citation to the record. This makes it difficult for Respondent to reply to Petitioner's Statement of
Facts. Respondent objects to Petitioner's recitation ofthe procedural history ofthis case and moves
that they be stricken. They are irrelevant and serve no purpose except to attempt to vilify
Respondent.
It appears that since Petitioner has no substantive defense to the present motion, Petitioner
has resorted, once again, to disparaging Respondent in an attempt to divert the attention away from
the relevant and dispositive facts asserted by Respondent, which have not been contested by
Petitioner. Despite the lack ofrelevance ofthe facts asserted by Petitioner, Respondent is compelled
to respond to the Statement ofFacts presented by Petitioner. Further since Petitioner has imbedded
argument with her statement of facts, Respondent is compelled to reply to the argument in his
response.
PETITIONER'S FACT No.1:
DECREE AND AMENDED DECREE
June 27, 2001
1. A review ofthe pleadings in the divorce proceedings reveals that both parties
alleged, verified, certified and represented, in their multiple pleadings, that the parties
were married on May, 3, 1964 and lived together as husband and wife thereafter. No
one disputes that between May 3, 1964 and the date the original Decree ofDivorce
was entered, the parties lived together as husband and wife. During that time, they
held themselves out as husband and wife to the community, held property as husband
and wife, operated joint bank accounts, encouraged a general reputation in the
community ofbeing husband and wife; and significantly, filed joint federal and state
tax returns avowing that they were legally married and thereby reaping the benefits
ofthe "married" filing status. In the proceedings, neither party denied that, at the time
of the divorce, the parties had been married thirty-seven (37) years.
RESPONDENT'S RESPONSE Re: Paragraph [1]: Respondent acknowledges that the
relationship between Petitioner and Respondent may have met the requirements ofUCA § 30-1-4.5
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(1) (a) - (e), with the possible exception ofthe consent! requirement. However, neither party applied
for a determination or establishment ofmarriage during the time of their relationship or within the
requisite one year after their relationship ended. Furthermore, despite at least two requests by
Respondent to Petitioner to solemnize the marriage, the marriage was never solemnized. See
paragraph 10 of Respondent's Statement ofFacts. At the time the Petitioner filed this divorce
proceeding and at all stages in the proceedings that followed, Petitioner knew that she and
Respondent had not been married. That knowledge was reinforced by Respondent's requests in
recent years for them to solemnize their marriage. See paragraph 10 ofRespondent's Statement of
Facts.
Respondent acknowledges that he is equally at fault with Petitioner in failing to bring to the
attention of the Court the fact that the purported marriage ofPetitioner and Respondent had never
been solemnized. However, it should be noted that Petitioner made the misrepresentation to the
Court. Respondent merely failed to deny the misrepresentation, not recognizing the significance of
the issue. See paragraph 11 ofRespondent's Statement ofFacts.
PETITIONER'S FACT No.2:
2. The divorce proceeding, as reflected by the court file and docket reflects that
the matter was bifurcated to allow the parties to be divorced on March 5,2001,
before the substantiative issues in their case were decided. An Amended Decree of
Divorce was ultimately entered with appropriate Findings, on June 27, 2001, which
was to be effective on May 29, 2001. Both parties were represented by counsel
during the proceeding and the Amended Decree was the product of a Stipulation
drafted, accepted and acknowledged by both parties and their attorneys. For the
Consent is required to validate a marriage under DCA §30-l-4.5. The Supreme Court in Whyte v.
Blair, 885 P.2d 791 (Utah 1994) looked at factors that show evidence ofconsentto be married. One
ofthe things the Court looked at was a case out ofHawaii, Maria v. Freitas, 73 Haw. 266, 832 P.2d
259,262 (1992). In Maria the wife refused several proposals of marriage after cohabiting. The
court reasoned: In contrast, strong evidence ofconsent, such as (1) living together for 19 years, (2)
having a child, (3) having a general reputation as married, and (4) having the mother ofone of the
partners living with them, was held insufficient to establish consent where the woman refused the
man's marriage proposals on several occasions and some of their financial affairs were handled
separately. Maria @ 262.
-lll-
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Court's convenience, a copy of the Amended Decree is attached hereto as Exhibit
"A. 1t
In summary, the Amended Decree ordered as follows:
PropertY Division Under the Amended Decree
A. Family Home
The Petitioner was awarded the family home in American Fork, subject to the debt
and the real property surrounding the family home (Paragraph 3, Amended Decree).
B. Smith Barney Funds
The Court awarded the Petitioner the funds from the Smith Barney funds, after the
cumulative legal fees ofFrederick Jackman, Rosemond Blakelock and Don Petersen,
were paid (Paragraph 4, Amended Decree).
C. International Automated Systems
This asset represented the bulk of the parties estate. The parties owned eight
million shares of stock in International Automated Systems, lAS, also known as
"V-Check." Because the parties had concluded that an actual stock split would not
be practical, the Petittioner [Sic] was awarded, as her share ofthis asset, $2,800,000,
the funds in the Smith Barney account, as well as the award ofthe real property
was to be, as stated in the Amended Decree, "Petitioner's one-half share of the
property settlement." (Emphasis added) (paragraph 5, Amended Decree).
The Respondent was to pay the Plaintiff her share of the property settlement, in
monthly payments, commencing, July 1, 2001, in the sum of$8,333.33, payable on
or before, the 15th of each month. Any amount still due and owing on July 1, 2006,
was due on that day, with no prepayment penalty. The Petitioner's interest was to be
secured by a trust deed and trust deed note in the "V-Check real and personal
property and inventory, behind, in priority, only to Zion's Bank, in the approximate
sum of $600,000 (paragraph 5, Amended Decree)
D. Patents.
The Respondent was awarded all his patents, all patents pending and all his creative
ideas (paragraph 6 Amended Decree).
Alimony Under the Amended Decree
Based upon the amount ofproperty accumulated by the parties and particularly, the
size of the monthly payments the Respondent was to pay to the Petitioner, no
alimony was awarded to the Petitioner (paragraph 11, Amended Decree).
RESPONDENT'S RESPONSE Re: Paragraph [2]: Respondent controverts the stated fact that
-lV-
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the "Amended Decree was a product of a stipulation drafted, accepted and acknowledged by both
parties and attorneys". Although the parties and their counsel did approve the fonn ofthe Amended
Decree, there was no written stipulation. Respondent also asks the Court to remember that the
Respondent has since repeatedly asserted the position that there was no meeting ofthe minds with
regard to the purported agreement which led to the entry of the Amended Decree of Divorce. The
lack ofmeeting of the minds asserted by Respondent has been manifest in the disputes over which
parcels ofreal property were to be conveyed to Petitioner, over the fonn ofthe Trust Deed and Trust
Deed Note for the Salem property, and over the application ofthe one action rule mandated by Utah
trust deed statute.
Respondent has consistently asserted the position from the time that the issue first arose, that
as the Amended Divorce Decree states that Petitioner was entitled to receive two parcels ofproperty
and only two parcels ofproperty, those being the parcels identified as Parcel ill No. 13-076-008 and
Parcel ill No. 13-059-0019 in the records of the Utah County Recorder. This included the family
home and the surrounding acreage ofthat parcel and another parcel ofproperty with a home located
on it.
The monthlypayment set forth in the Amended Decree ofDivorce was to be secured by Trust
Deed on the Salem property. See paragraph No.5 ofthe AmendedDecree ofDivorce. Respondent
prepared a Trust Deed and a Trust Deed Note, executed the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note, and
delivered them to a title company, which then recorded the Trust Deed and delivered the Trust Deed
and Trust Deed Note to counsel for the Petitioner. Petitioner accepted the Trust Deed and the Trust
Deed Note and raised no objections whatsoever to the fonn or content ofthe Trust Deed or the Trust
Deed Note. The Trust Deed was executed on August 28, 2002, and recorded on September 4, 2002.
See Recorded Trust Deed attached as Exhibit "A" to this Reply. The Trust Deed and Trust Deed
Note were delivered to counsel for Petitioner at that time. Thereafter on the March 7, 2003,
-v-
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Commissioner Patton, on his own motion, with no objection or motion having been presented by
Petitioner regarding the fonn or content of the Trust Deed or Trust Deed Note, ruled that the Trust
Deed and Trust Deed Note were unacceptable. That decision was ultimately upheld by Judge
Laycock. Respondent thereafter appealed. Under those circumstances, such an appeal was clearly
in good faith. Further, because Respondent was ofthe strong conviction at that point that he could
not longer receive a fair hearing regarding any issue in front ofJudge Laycock, he moved for Judge
Laycock to be disqualified. Respondent was particularly disconcerted by his conclusion that Judge
Laycock appeared to act as attorney for Petitioner with regard to the Trust Deed issue. Again, this
action by Respondent was a good faith attempt to regain his confidence that he would be treated
fairly by the Court.
Subsequent to the entry ofthe Amended Decree ofDivorce, Petitioner has asserted that she
is entitled, in addition to receiving essentially all ofthe cash ofthe parties, that she is further entitled
to receive all of the real property of the parties (four parcels, not two parcels), except for the Salem
property which had a $600,000.00 loan on it. Respondent was to receive the stock ofIAS which
merely entitled him to work long hours for very little pay and yet have an obligation to pay
$2,800,000.00 to Petitioner. She has further asserted that she has a choice as to whether to seek a
personal judgment against Respondent for failure to payor to proceed under the Trust Deed or both,
contrary to the Utah trust deed statute, namely Utah Code Annotated §78-37-1 (1965). The dispute
over what real property Petitioner was entitled to receive, the terms of the trust deed and the trust
deed note, and Petitioner's obligation to adhere to the Utah trust deed statute led Respondent to
conclude that there had been no meeting of the minds and therefore that the Amended Decree of
Divorce should be set aside.
Respondent also disputes that International Automated Systems represented the bulk of the
parties estate. As stated above, the stock Respondent was to receive merely entitled him to work
-Vl-
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long hours for very little pay. Future value of the stock was, and is, based on future efforts of
Respondent.
Also, Respondent controverts the assertions that Petitioner and Respondent were the co-
owners ofthe Smith Barney Account and the lAS Stock. Neldon Johnson was the sole owner ofthe
Smith Barney Account as well as the sole owner of the lAS Stock.
Respondent further controverts Petitioner's assertion that Respondent's attorney fees owed
to Don Petersen were paid from the Smith Barney Account. Only a portion of those fees were paid
from the Smith Barney Account.
PETITIONER'S FACT No.3:
3. There is no question that after the Amended Decree ofDivorce was entered
in this matter on June 27, 2001, which was to be effective on May 29, 2001, no
Rule 50, 59 or 60 motions were made from the Amended Decree or the Findings
and Conclusions supporting the same. Further, no appeal was taken from either
side from the final judgement represented by the Amended Decree. The divorce
was finalized and completed with the entry ofthe Amended Decree on June 27,
2001, to be effective May 29, 2001.
RESPONDENT'S RESPONSE Re: Paragraph [3]: As stated above, it was not until the parties
began to perform their respective obligations under the Amended Divorce Decree that it became
apparent to Respondent that there had been no meeting of the minds with regard to the Amended
Decree ofDivorce. The first dispute was with regard to the parcels ofreal property that were to be
conveyed to Petitioner. The Amended Decree ofDivorce identifies two parcels, which Respondent
understood to mean parcels identified as Parcel ID No. 13-076-008 (1.81 acres) and Parcel ID No.
13-059-0019 (5.55 acres) in the records ofthe Utah County Recorder. Petitioner, however, took the
position that there were four parcels that were to be conveyed, namely Parcel ill No. 13-076-008
(1.81 acres), Parcel ill No. 13-059-0019 (5.55 acres), Parcel ID No. 13-078-001 (6.65 acres) and
Parcel ID No. 13-076-0015 (1.84 acres).
The second major dispute was over the form of the Trust Deed for the Salem property.
-Vll-
2053
- - - - - - ---- - -- -- - - - -
,
Respondent, in fact, thought that there was no dispute over the form ofthe Trust Deed and when he
prepared the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note in accordance with his understanding of the
agreement, the Trust Deed was recorded by the title company, the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note
were transmitted to Petitioner, and Petitioner accepted the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note without
complaint. It was only after the Court, on its own motion, rejected the Trust Deed and Trust Deed
Note, that Petitioner jumped on that band wagon. It was at that point that Respondent had no choice
but to take the position that there was no meeting ofthe minds with regard to that issue as well. The
issue ofthe Trust Deed and the issue of the parcels ofreal property to be conveyed, have been the
subject ofseveral motions and current appeals. Respondent continues to maintain, in good faith, that
there was no meeting ofthe minds with regard to the purported agreement that led to the entry ofthe
Amended Decree ofDivorce and therefore that it is invalid and unenforceable. That position clearly
has been asserted in good faith.
PETITIONER'S FACT No.4:
4. At no time during the divorce proceedings or within the one year after its
entry, did the Respondent ever disavow his representations to this Court, to the
community, to state and federal tax agencies, that he and the Petitioner were
"married" as carefully established in the Complaint and response thereto.
RESPONDENT'S RESPONSE Re: Paragraph [4]: As stated previously, Respondent admits that
he is equally at fault with Petitioner in regard to the misrepresentations to the Court regarding the
marriage of Petitioner and Respondent. However, Petitioner is the party that made the original
misrepresentation. Respondent merely failed to deny it, not recognizing the significance ofthe issue.
See Respondent's Statement ofFacts, paragraph 11.
PETITIONER'S FACT No.5:
5. As this Court knows, although a decree maybe finalized, parties are allowed
in domestic cases to file new matters relating to the on-going relationship between
the parties, operating under the terms of the decree, in the same action. However,
each such new proceeding constitutes a new action or proceeding.
-Vlll-

8. In the Court's Amended Minutes, dated August 15,2001, attached hereto as
Exhibit "B," Commissioner Patton ordered the requested deeds to be delivered to
counsel for Respondent's office within five (5) days and then for counsel for
Respondent to have them signed and delivered to counsel for Petitioner's office
within five (5) business days thereafter. In addition, the Court appointed a Forensic
Accountant, to be paid for equally by both parties to resolve the accounting and
payment issues; and, finally, the Court ordered a police officer to be present for a
final exchange ofpersonal property.
RESPONDENT'S RESPONSE Re: Paragraph [7 & 8]: Respondent has explained in his
response Re: Paragraphs 2-4 and 6 above the ongoing dispute regarding the real property that was
to be conveyed. Those responses are hereby incorporated by reference.
PETITIONER'S FACT Nos. 9-12:
ORDER ON OBJECTION TO ORDER FROM ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
September 18, 2002
9. In a theme that has become the Respondent's modus operandi, the Ruling of
CommissionerPatton was objected to by the Respondent and then prolonged byhim.
It was from August 15,2001, until August 19,2002, a year and four days, before
the matter came on for hearing before Judge Claudia Laycock for determination. The
Findings of Fact and Order from those proceedings was signed on September 18,
2002. There is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit "C," a copy ofthe
Findings ofFact, Conclusions ofLaw, In Re: Order to Show Cause.
10. In the Court's Finding's, the Court characterized the testimony of the
Respondent. In paragraphs 1-3 of the Findings, it recites:
1. The Court heard the testimony ofboth parties and find that the testimony of
the Respondent is not credible.
2. The Court fmds that it is absurd...
3. The Court finds that the Respondent's testimony
regarding his admission to signing the three checks is
nonsensical.
11. In Paragraph 8, the Court found that "the Respondent converted $22,500.00 of
funds, that were intended by the Court to be paid to Petitioner, for his own use." (Emphasis
added). The Court found in Paragraph 9 ofthe Findings that "the Respondent willfully disobeyed
the previous orders ofthe Court." Paragraph 10 states "[t]hat the Court finds the Respondent
had the ability to obey the previous orders ofthe Court but failed to do so." (Emphasis added).
In Paragraph 11, the Court found the "Respondent in contempt of Court, for his willful refusal
to follow the orders of the Court." (Emphasis added).
12. In Paragraph 13, the Court made this insightful observation that would characterize
the Respondent's conduct throughout:
The Court finds that Respondent believes that he has the ability to determine
-x-
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which Court orders he will follow.
RESPONDENT'S RESPONSE Re: Paragraph [9 - 12J: This relative minor dispute over the
proceeds from a $22,500.00 sale ofIAS stock merelyhas to do with whether the proceeds ofthat sale
were subject to the Amended Divorce Decree or were subject to the pre-decree orders ofthe Court.
It has nothing to do with the question before the Court on this motion and is merely an attempt by
the Petitioner to divert attention away from the irrefutable facts which are dispositive ofthis motion.
PETITIONER'S FACT No. 13-23:
13. Important to the Petitioner, the Court made the following order with regard
to the trust deed that he was required to sign pursuant to Paragraph 5 ofthe Amended
Decree of Divorce, as found on Page 5 of that document under the subsection (d):
Petitioner shall be granted a secured interest in the "D-Check real and
personal real property, to include all inventory, and shall be a lien
holder in the second position behind the existing loan at Zion's bank
in the approximate balance of$600,000.00. Security to be a trust deed
and trust deed note.
14. As noted in Paragraph 5 ofthe same page ofthe Amended Decree, that property was
the only security that the Petitioner had to rely upon to enforce the Respondent's obligation to make
the$8,333.33monthlypaymentscomprisingthe$2,800,000.00propertysettlementthatincludedthe
property division as well as a substitute for alimony from the 37 year marriage.
15. In paragraph 15 ofthe Order entered by the Court on September 18,2002,
(Exhibit "C"), the Court ordered:
The Court finds that the Amended Decree at paragraph 5E requires
as Trust Deed Note to be issued and that the Respondent shall see
that the orders are followed as set out in the Amended Decree.
As demonstrated hereinafter, as with the required monthly payments, the
Respondent, to this day, has failed to comply with this provision of the Amended
Decree, again placing the Petitioner's right to the property settlement and the
monthly payments upon which she relies to live upon, in jeopardy.
16. In Paragraph 19, the Court found that the Respondent had failed to "take care of
his obligations."
In Paragraphs 20 and 21, the Court found:
20. The Court finds that the Respondent has failed to make the monthly
payments due to the Petitioner in the amount of $8,333.33 as set
forth in paragraph 5a of the Amended Decree ofDivorce.
21. The Court finds that the Respondent admitted that he chose not
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to make the monthly payments to Petitioner as required in the
Amended Decree ofDivorce (Emphasis added).
17. In Paragraph 22, the Court granted Judgment in the amount of $25,999.99 for the
monthly payments due Petitioner for the months ofMay, June, July and August, 2002.
18. In Paragraph 23, the Court found the Respondent in contempt:
The Court finds that the Respondent shall be held in contempt
for his willful failure to make the monthly payment to Petitioner
as ordered in the parties Amended Decree of Divorce and his
willful failure to sign the Trust Deed or Trust Deed Note.
(Emphasis added)
19. It is the Petitioner's contention that outside the rancor that sometimes characterizes
a divorce proceeding, the Respondent will do anything and everything to thwart the legal process
and deprive the Petitioner ofthe Court's award as set out in the Amended Decree ofDivorce. The
Court's characterization of the Respondent's testimony and the resulting action of the Court in
holding the Respondent in contempt emphasizes that point. Importantly, it was the claim of the
Petitioner, that the Respondent, besides being in contempt ofCourt, considered the divorce action,
a game. Further, that he thought he was smarter than the Petitioner, smarter that her lawyers, smarter
than the Court and that no one could extract the money ordered under the Amended Decree from
him. To date, the Respondent has been successful. However, In Judge Laycock's Finding's about this
precise issue, she stated, starting at Finding number 28:
28. The Court finds that at this point, it is speculation that the
Respondent Is destroying the business assets upon which the award
to Petitioner was based.
29. The Court finds that, at this pont, it lacks sufficient evidence before
the Court to appoint a forensic accountant. The Court does find that
the Petitioner is actually requesting a special master be appointed.
30. The Court finds that if Mr. Johnson quits making the $8,333.33
monthly payment to Petitioner and does not keep current on his
monthly financial obligations to Petitioner that the Court would
probably grant the Petitioner's request, for a forensic accountant, the
next time the request is made and determine what is occurring with
Respondent's financial dealings. (Emphasis added).
20. As demonstrated hereinafter, the Respondent has failed to satisfy the judgment for
the monthly accrued payments of $25,999.99, representing the missed monthly payments for the
months of May through August, 2002. Since that date, he has failed to make any payments.
Through December, 2004, there have been 28 months elapse since August 2002 and, without
prejudgment interest, 28 multiplied by $8,333.33 equals $233,333.24. In addition, the
Respondent owes $13,380.55 in property taxes on the property supposedly securing the
Petitioner's property award. Further, Petitioner has been required to pay taxes owed by the
Respondent's company that the IRS was going to lien on the subject property. If any set of
circumstances ever cried out for a citation for contempt, an appointment of a special master,
a forensic accountant, a freezing of the Respondent's assets and an immediate imposition of
a jail term, Petitioner submits that it is this case.
-Xll-
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ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
September 27,2002
21. This matter came on before the Court again on September 27,2002, a little over
one month after the last order, based again upon the Respondent's continued failure to abide by
the Court's order. At the last minute, before the order to show cause, the Respondent paid the
Petitioner the $25,000.00 awarded in the Court's prior order. However, the Court found that the
Respondent was again, over a month late in delivering the deeds and held him in contempt
and ordered him to do 100 hours of community service through the United Way at the rate
of 20 hours a month. The Court applied the $25,000 payments to the monthly payments of
$8,333.33 for the months ofJuly, August and September, 2002. Only July and August were covered
by the previous judgment for back due payments granted in the 9/18/02 Order, leaving the judgment
for May and June, 2002, totaling $16,666.66 unpaid.
22. Judgment was awarded to Petitioner for attorney fees in the amount of $1,000.00.
Importantly, the Court again states on page two of the Ruling:
The Court is not persuaded that a Forensic Accountant is necessary at this time. If
respondent does not become current within a few months the Court will question as
to whether one should be appointed. (Emphasis added).
23. It is the Petitioner's view that by spreading the proceedings out, hiring new counsel
and getting having the proceedings in front ofdifferent judges, the Respondent has succeeded in his
campaign not to have the Court freeze his assets, appoint a Forensic Accountant and take the steps
necessary to assure that the Petitioner gets the benefit of a 37 year marriage. A copy of the Court's
Minutes from the Order to Show Cause held on September 27,2002 are attached as Exhibit "D."
A review of the file will indicate that the Respondent even attempted to manipulate the company
through which he provided community service so that he would not have to do any work. Petitioner
submits that there is simply no tactic that the Respondent will not employ to frustrate the orders of
this Court. Petitioner has documented the communityexcursion material because it shows the effort
the Respondent will go to in this matter to disobey the simplest of orders. The documents are
included with Exhibit "D."
RESPONDENT'S RESPONSE Re: Paragraph [13 -23]: All of the proceedings alluded to by
Petitioner are the result of the dispute over the form of the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note, the
security to be provided by the Trust Deed for the payments, and the application of the limitations
and obligations of the Utah Trust Deed statute with regard to this Trust Deed. There is nothing in
the Amended Divorce Decree that excepts the Trust Deed contemplated by the Amended Divorce
Decree from application of the Utah trust deed statute. Further, as indicated previously, neither
Petitioner nor counsel objected to the form of the Trust Deed or Trust Deed delivered until much
later. The Court on its own motion rejected those documents, without having received any prior
objection by the Petitioner. Petitioner has, on the other hand, sought to obtain personal judgment
-Xlll-
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against the Respondent, contrary to the trust deed statute, therebyviolating the one action rule. That
matter is currently on appeal.
Again, however, it must be noted that none of these proceedings over the interpretation of
the Amended Decree ofDivorce and whether there was a meeting ofthe minds between the parties
and therefore a valid decree, have anything to do with the question of whether there was and is
subject matter jurisdiction in this case.
PETITIONER'S FACT No. 23:
DISQUALIFICATION PROCEEDINGS
23. It is the Petitioner's view that by spreading the proceedings out, hiring new counsel
and getting having the proceedings in front ofdifferent judges, the Respondent has succeeded in his
campaign not to have the Court freeze his assets, appoint a Forensic Accountant and take the steps
necessary to assure that the Petitioner gets the benefit of a 37 year marriage. A copy of the Court's
Minutes from the Order to Show Cause held on September 27,2002 are attached as Exhibit "D."
A review of the file will indicate that the Respondent even attempted to manipulate the company
through which he provided community service so that he would not have to do any work. Petitioner
submits that there is simply no tactic that the Respondent will not employ to frustrate the orders of
this Court. Petitioner has documented the community excursion material because it shows the effort
the Respondent will go to in this matter to disobey the simplest of orders. The documents are
included with Exhibit "D."
RESPONDENT'S RESPONSE Re: Paragraph [23]: Again, this is merely an obvious attempt
by Petitioner to disparage the Respondent and to do so with the hope of diverting attention away
from the law and facts that are dispositive of this motion. However, Respondent made no attempt
"to manipulate the company through which he provided community service so that he would not
have to do any work." The Respondent actually performed the community service documented by
the recipient of that service. A subsequent decision by Judge Laycock that the service did not
qualify, because Respondent might receive an indirect benefit from the service, i.e. good will with
a potential client ofIAS, did not change the fact that Respondent had actuallyperformed the service.
Again, however, it has nothing to do with the present motion.
PETITIONER'S FACT No. 24 - 27:
September 18, 2002
24. With the posture of the case [mally in a position where the Respondent had been
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cited in contempt, the record replete with his failure to make payments, the Court's admonitions
regarding a Forensic Accountant and other sanctions, the Respondent obviously has at least two
choices. The Respondent can start complying with the Court's order and find another diversionary
tactic. Ofcourse, the Respondent opts for the latter and freezes the proceedings by filing a motion
to disqualify Judge Laycock. During all the time it takes to resolve this issue, the Respondent fails
to make one single payment under the Amended Decree.
25. The Respondent's Motion and Affidavit to disqualify were filed on July 8, 2003.
Judge Stott denied the same by Ruling dated July 22, 2003, attached hereto as Exhibit "E.". New
counsel for Respondent files a motion to set aside and amend the prior orders ofthe court which are
all denied by Ruling dated December 5, 2003, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "F."
Further Rulings on the issue were entered on November 21,2003 and December 5,2003, included
together as Exhibit "G." All orders denied the Respondent's substantiative motions and the motions
to disqualify Judge Laycock.
APPEAL
August 20, 2003
26. The Respondent filed a Notice ofAppeal on August 20, 2003. Respondent first tried
to appeal the Rulings denying his attempts to have Judge Laycock disqualified. The Court of
Appeals denied the appeal on jurisdictional grounds by order dated January 29, 2004. In an
unpublished decision, a copy ofwhich is attached hereto as Exhibit "H," the actions and orders of
the trial court were upheld.
27. The same strategy has continued to be employed by the Respondent to the present
day as reflected by the court docket and file. Unable to conceive any more arguments to avoid the
obligations to which he stipulated, Respondent has resorted to claiming that he did not know what
he was doing when he represented to this Court that he was married on a specific day ion 1964.
There is no question that if the Respondent had been able to get away from his obligations under
the Decree, he would never make the claim he is making in the pending motion.
RESPONDENT'S RESPONSE Re: Paragraph [24 - 27]: Respondent acknowledges that he lost
confidence in his ability to obtain a fair hearing under Judge Laycock. That was precipitated by
Commissioner Patton's sua sponte decision to reject Respondent's Trust Deed and Trust DeedNote
for the Salem property, without there having been any objection voiced by Petitioner, which was
ultimatelyupheld by Judge Laycock. It then appeared to Respondent that Judge Laycock was biased
against him and he filed a motion to have her disqualified. He remains adamant that the motion to
disqualify her was filed in good faith and was not in any way calculated to delay the proceedings.
Again, however, reference to these proceedings by Petitioner is merely an attempt to divert
the Court away from the dispositive facts and law that govern the question of subject matter
jurisdiction. The dispositive facts are that the parties were nevermarried and the purported marriage
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of Petitioner and Respondent was not solemnized during the period of time that they resided
together or within one year thereafter which is unequivocally required by Utah Code Annotated 30-
1-4.5. Respondent is certainly no more at fault for the misrepresentation to the Court regarding the
marriage than is the Petitioner. As stated above, it is the Petitioner who filed the complaint and
made the misrepresentation regarding the marriage to the Court. The Respondent simply failed to
deny that misrepresentation. His failure to do so was based upon his failure to recognize the
significance and his belief that the passage oftime alone created a marriage. See paragraph 11 of
Respondent's Statement ofFacts.
RESPONDENT'S REBUTTAL ARGUMENT
Petitioner raises two issues: 1) Respondent is estopped from asserting lack ofsubject matter
jurisdiction. 2) there is subject matter jurisdiction per the cases of Caffall and Vander Strappen.
I. PETITIONER CANNOT MEET THE ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL,
GENERAL ESTOPPEL &/OR STATUTORY ESTOPPEL (See UCA § 30-1-17.2)
To read Petitioner's version of this case the Respondent was soley responsible for the
misrepresentations made to the court. However, ifeither is more at fault it is Petitioner. Petitioner
filed for divorce and plead the marriage and the marriage date, even though she knew it was a false
statement. She alleged they were husband and wife in order to freeze Respondent's Smith Barney
account. With that act she took control ofassets that were not hers and in the process crippled lAS.
She also signed the parties tax returns. She also participated in the LDS Temple ceremony. She
initiated or participated in all ofthe things she now wants to lay at Respondent's feet as though she
was an innocent bystander, which she clearly is not. As to the issue ofsubject matter jurisdiction,
none offacts raised in Petitioner's Memorandum in Opposition are relevant or material to the issue
ofwhether there was a marriage. There was no marriage and there is no subject matter jurisdiction.
Petitioner alleges that estoppel bars Respondent from now raising subject matterjurisdiction.
Petitioner cannot meet the elements of estoppe1. All applicable forms of estoppel require that
Petitioner be innocent; that is, that she be able to say that she reasonably relied on Respondent's
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words, actions or inaction. This she cannot do. She has always known that they were never
married, in 1964 or at any other time. Under the facts ofthis case, she could not have been married
in May 1964 because she was 15 12 and did not have the requisite permission and authorization to
cure her age deficit. She did not avail herself of the cure provisions of UCA § 30-1-4.5 nor the
offers of Respondent, who on at least two occasions in the 1990's asked her to marry him to
solemnize their relationship. She refused. These are all uncontroverted facts.
Respondent urges the court to not lose sight ofwho filed the Petition alleging that a marriage
occurred on a specific date. Respondent has at least offered an explanation ofhis passive role and
why he waited until now to raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. See paragraph 11 of
Respondent's Statement ofFacts. That explanation remains uncontroverted. Petitioner, on the other
hand, has offered the court no explaination ofher affirmatiove misrepresentations. The Court's file
will confirm that Rosemond G. Blakelock has been Petitioner's attorney ofrecord since the petiton
was filed. Respondent, on the other hand, has had at least three law firms ofrecord. The attorneys
raising this argument only recently discovered the issue. Respondent has acted in good faith. As
soon as he knew that time alone was not enough to confer marital status on the couple (and hence
subject matter jurisdiction on the court) he brought that fact to the attention of the court. For that
he is vilified and accused of improper motive by Petitioner. This is not some belated argument
reserved for end game strategy. Given the amount ofposturing and rancor alleged by Petitioner, it
is logical that Respondent would have raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at the earliest
possible opportunity.
Petitioner cannot claim judicial estoppel. Even if, for arguments sake, you grant
Petitioner elements 1 - 3 of her judicial estoppel argument, she can never meet the fourth
element: "The party seeking judicial estoppel in the subsequent judicial proceedinlf must have
relied on the former testimony." [Emphasis added.] Petitioner's Memorandum at pg. 23.
2 This is not a subsequent judicial proceeding as alleged by Petitioner. This is all one
continuous judicial proceeding.
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Petitioner knew that she had never married Respondent. Therefore, she cannot now be found to
have relied on Respondent's acquiescence in her misrepresentation. She knew what she had
written (or caused to be written) was false. The same argument is true of general estoppel, as
stated in Youngblood v. Auto-Owners, 2007 UT 28, 158 P.3d 1088, 1092 and the same is true in the
provisions ofstatutory estoppel per UCA § 30-1-17.2 and discussed in Respondents initial briefin
Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P.2d 1177, 1180-81 (Utah App. 1988). Estoppel is a principle of equity
requiring Petitioner to meet the standard of reasonable reliance on Respondents words, acts or
inactions. Again, this she cannot do.
II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Respondent has found no Utah case stating that subject matter jurisdiction is not necessary
in order for a court to adjudicate a divorce matter before it. Petitioners brief notwithstanding,
Caffall and Van Der Strappen, though critical of Caffall, stand for the premise that subject matter
jurisdiction is necessary to adjudicate a divorce.
Barton v. Barton, 2001 UT App 199,29 P.3d 13,16, is another recent divorce case, in along
line ofdecisions, addressing the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Barton states the following:
...."A court's initial inquiry should always be to determine whether it has
jurisdiction to determine a controversy." [Citations omitted]
****
~ 12 We first address application of the PKPA, noting that the application of the
PKPA was not brought to the attention ofthe trial court. However, "'lack ofsubject
matter jurisdiction cannot be stipulated around nor cured by a waiver. A lack of
subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time and when subject matter
[jurisdiction] does not exist. neither the parties nor the court can do anything to fill
that void. III Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172, 1174 (Utah Ct.App. 1991) (quoting
Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 726 (Utah Ct.App. 1990)). [Emphasis added.]
Consequently, counsel may raise the defense that the court failed to complywith the
requirements of the UCCJA and the PKPA at anytime in the course ofan interstate
custody proceeding. In addition, subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJA and
the PKPA cannot be vested by agreement ofthe parties, ... and such jurisdiction
cannot be conferred on the court by a party's failure to interpose a timely
objection to the court's assumption of jurisdiction. [Emphasis added.]
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Petitioner argues Van Der Strappen at pages 26-28 ofher Memorandum stating:
The Court held that a court faced with a determination that the marriage sued upon
is not valid, is not deprived of subject matter jurisdiction; rather, is deprived of
granting a specific remedy, a decree ofdivorce. As noted by the Court, the trial court
maintains jurisdiction to enter equitable orders regarding the distribution ofproperty
and other matters and therefore, is not denied subject matter jurisdiction. [Emphasis
added.]
This is not the holding of Van Der Strappen, and what follows in Petitioner's Memorandum at
pages 27-28 is nothing more than dicta recited from footnote 8 of Van Der Strappen criticizing the
decision in Caffall. Van Der Strappen @ 1340.
III. CAFFALL & VAN DER STRAPPEN
A. Caffall v. Caffall, 5 Utah 2d 407, 410 (1956), 303 P.2d 286.
Respondent has found no divorce cases that say the court does not need subject matter
jurisdiction to adjudicate a case, including Caffall. Furthermore Caffall is the only case of which
Respondent is aware where the court said, in essence, we do not have subject matter jurisdiction, but
we are not going to set the decree aside. Caffall was decided on principles ofequity and estoppel that
do not exist in this case. Respondent has discussed most ofthe things that distinguish his case from
Caffall in his initial memorandum. The following are two additional distinctions.
1. The Court in Caffall was worried that Mr. Caffall was trying to avoid paying child
support. In the present case the Johnson's have no minor children.
2. In Caffall, only Mr. Caffall was charged with perpetrating a fraud on the court. In the
present case both parties knew they had never married. Respondent stated that his
passive concurrence was due to his understanding that the passage of time had
established a common law marriage. He stated that he did not know otherwise until
just recently.
B. Van Der Stappen v. Van DerStappen, 815 P.2d 1335, 1337-38 (Utah App. 1991),
815 P.2d 1335, 1337.
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Petitioner's reliance on the Van Der Strappen decision is misplaced. As stated above,
Petitioner relied largely on dicta involving the court's criticism ofCaffall and not the holding ofthe
Van Der Strappen court. Mr. VanDer Stappen claimed that his marriage to Mrs. VanDer Stappen
was void ab initio and that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter a divorce decree
because at the time ofthe parties' wedding his wife's previous marriage to another man had not yet
been legally dissolved. The trial court refused to vacate the decree; the Court ofAppeals reversed.
The issue was whether his divorce decree was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
because there was never a valid marriage between the parties. The court's analysis is as follows:
... However, ajudgment is void when entered by a court that lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the controversy, and must be set aside under Utah R.Civ.P.
60(b)(5). Id. Furthermore, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a
court by consent or waiver, and ajudgment can be attacked for lack ofsubj ect matter
jurisdiction at any time. Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah App.
1987)....
* * * *
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-2 (Supp. 1991).[fn2] Because appellee's prior divorce was
not final and absolute until some time after her wedding to appellant, under section
30-1-2, the marriage of the parties was void at its outset, and no court action was
required to establish this. Sanders v. Industrial Comm'n, 64 Utah 372, 230 P. 1026,
1027 (1924). Furthermore, the marriage could not be validated by the fact that the
parties conducted themselves as husband and wife for several years after appellee's
prior divorce became fina1.[fn3] Jenkins v. Jenkins, 107 Utah 239, 153 P.2d 262,
263 (1944) (citing Sanders, 230 P. at 1027). Accordingly, there was never a
marriage from which a decree ofdivorce could be obtained. Jenkins, 153 P.2d at 263
("Since the purported marriage was void there was no grounds nor necessity for
divorce").
Mr. Van Der Strappen argued that because no marriage ever existed that the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter a decree. He argued that Caffall v. Caffall, 5 Utah 2d 407,
303 P.2d 286 (1956), supported his position. The Van Der Strappen Court quoting Caffall said:
"The Utah Supreme Court stated that the trial court 'had no jurisdiction ofthe subject matter since
there had been no legal marriage" between the Caffalls. '" Id. 303 P.2d at 288. Though not raised
or briefed the Van Der Strappen Court commented on harmless error stating: "Additionally, as long
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as Caffall stands as precedent, it is questionable whether the entry ofjudgment where subject matter
jurisdiction is lacking can ever be harmless." Id @ 1340.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to Petitioner's assertion, Respondent does deny that he affirmatively represented
and certified to this Court and to the community and governmental agencies that he was married to
the Petitioner on the date alleged in the Complaint and he can and did explain how or why, when
initially confronted with the specific allegation in the Complaint that the parties were married on
May 3, 1964, he admitted the allegation. See Respondent's briefs, including paragraph 10 of
Respondent's Statement ofFacts. For the reasons cited in this reply brief and those contained in
Respondent's initial briefthis Court does not have subject matterjurisdiction to adjudicate a divorce
between these parties pursuant to Utah RCiv.P. 12(b)(I) and Utah RCiv.P. 12(h). Therefore, the
decrees and other judgements and orders previously entered are void pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P.
60(b)(4)3 and the petition must be dismissed.
DATED this 5th day of November, 2007.
3previously codified as Utah RCiv.P. 60(b)(5).
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the forgoing REPLY MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO VACATE DECREE OF DIVORCE AND AMENDED
DECREE OF DIVORCE AND MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR WANT OF
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION PURSUANT TO UTAH R.CIV.P. 12(b)(1), 12(h)
AND 60(b)(4) was mailed, postage prepaid, faxed or hand delivered to the following parties:
Rosemond G. Blakelock
75 South 300 West
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorney for Ina Marie Johnson
DATED this 5t1i day of November, 2007.
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